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Introduction
The original 2001 United Nations (UN) codification of the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) granted the UN Security Council
exclusive control over authorizing use of force in sovereign states. 1
Unfortunately, as demonstrated over the past 20 years, the need for
humanitarian intervention has not changed and the use of force in the
name of humanitarian intervention has not always occurred even
when the need for such intervention was dire. 2 When the UN Security
Council is deadlocked and a humanitarian crisis is at hand, it is
necessary to have a means of using low-intensity military force to
prevent mass atrocity crimes. In this article, we discuss the need for a
framework for non-UN authorized military force in the name of
humanitarian intervention. Expanding on previous work, 3 we set forth
a seven-point framework for countries to follow if they wish to
justifiably use military force in humanitarian crises without UN
authorization.

Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Crises
Under R2P, a state itself is responsible for protecting its own
people. 4 However, the third pillar of R2P indicates that there is a
broader responsibility that falls on the international community when
a state is “unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibility to protect or
is itself the actual perpetrator of crimes or atrocities.” 5 The UN
Charter generally prohibits the use of force by outside states within
sovereign states and sets forth a state’s right to be free from
intervention, except for measures authorized by the Security Council,

1.

Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
transmitted by Letter Dated 26 July 2002 from the Permanent
Representative of Canada to the United Nations Addressed to the
Secretary-General, The Responsibility to Protect, at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/57/303 (2001) [hereinafter R2P Report].

2.

See generally Aiden Hehir, Response: The Responsibility to Protect
POST
(Feb.
26,
2016),
Doctrine
Has
Failed,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/intheory/wp/2016/02/26/response-the-responsibility-to-protect-doctrinehas-failed/ [http://perma.cc/85F5-Z4ZS] (describing the ineffectiveness
of R2P due to improper implementation by States).

3.

See Paul R. Williams et al., Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The
Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis, 45 CASE WESTERN RES. J.
INT’L L. 473 (2012) (discussing the use of military options under R2P
and its application to the Syrian Crisis).

4.

R2P Report, supra note 1, at 13.

5.

Id. at 17.
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such as actions justified by R2P. 6 In certain cases, however, political
dynamics on the Security Council may prevent UN member states
from gaining the authorization to intervene in serious humanitarian
crises (e.g. Kosovo). 7 Currently, R2P lacks a framework for the
limited use of force when there is a humanitarian emergency and an
occurrence of mass atrocity crimes but the Security Council is
deadlocked. 8
When a state is committing mass atrocity crimes against its own
people, a coalition of the willing has the right, and arguably the
obligation, to intervene to cease the crimes. 9 Under R2P, low-level
and low-intensity use of force is reserved for actions that fit within
the UN Charter Chapter VII framework. 10 This use of force can only
be deployed when peaceful options, including sanctions and
diplomacy, have been exhausted and the actions are subject to
approval by the UNSC. 11 As R2P states:
There is no better or more appropriate body than the United
Nations Security Council to authorize military intervention for
human protection purposes. The task is not to find alternatives
to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make
the Security Council work better than it has. Security Council
authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military
intervention action being carried out. Those calling for an
intervention should formally request such authorization, or have
the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the
Secretary General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter.
The Security Council should deal promptly with any request for
authority to intervene where there are allegations of large scale
loss of human life or ethnic cleansing. It should in this context
seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on the group
that might support a military intervention. 12

However, as has been observed during the conflict in Syria, the
international community cannot necessarily depend on the Security
6.

See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 4, 7 (prohibiting the use of force generally),
see also U.N. Charter art. 39, ¶ 1 (giving the Security Council authority
to determine the existence of threat and the right measure to take).

7.

See Christopher Greenwood, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of
Kosovo, 10 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 141 (1999) (discussing the failure of
NATO in Kosovo and questioning the nature of modern international
law in times of humanitarian crisis).

8.

Williams et al., supra note 3, at 476.

9.

R2P Report, supra note 1, at 52.

10.

Id. at 33-4.

11.

Id. at XII.

12.

Id.
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Council to approve appropriate use of force under R2P. Time and
time again, Russia has vetoed Security Council Resolutions on Syria
that do not align with its own political interests in the conflict; as of
April 11, 2018, Russia used 12 vetoes on Security Council Resolutions
for Syria. 13
Consequently, the U.S. government has been faced with
challenges throughout the Syrian conflict about whether and how to
intervene in the face of humanitarian crisis and mass atrocity crimes.
Both the Obama and Trump administrations have taken low-intensity
military action in Syria to prevent further mass atrocity crimes. 14 In
connection with that, we will turn now to a discussion of the April
2018 chemical weapon attacks by the Assad regime against the Syrian
people and the U.S. government’s subsequent actions.

The U.S. Government’s Response to Syria’s Chemical
Weapon Attacks
On April 7, 2018, the Syrian government attacked civilians with
chemical weapons in the Damascus suburb of Douma. 15 After the
April 7, 2018 chemical weapon attacks in Syria, Russia blocked a
Security Council resolution “that would have established a mechanism
to investigate use of such weapons in Syria, as well as another
concerning a fact-finding mission in the war-torn country.” 16 On April
13, 2018, after multiple failed attempts to pass UN Security Council
Resolutions that would investigate these attacks, the U.S. authorized
its military to conduct airstrikes against three facilities associated
13.

Russia’s 12 Vetoes on Syria, RAIDIÓ TEILIFÍS ÉIREANN (Apr. 11, 2018,
7:47 PM), https://www.rte.ie/news/world/2018/0411/953637-russiasyria-un-veto/ [https://perma.cc/6N7M-S5CS].

14.

See Barbara P. Usher, Obama’s Syria legacy: Measured diplomacy,
strategic explosion, BBC (Jan. 13, 2017) (arguing that both Barack
Obama and President Trump showed reluctance to military intervention
in
Syria),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38297343
[https://perma.cc/SQY2-F2JP]; see also Eric Schmitt & Maggie
Haberman, Trump to Allow Months for Troop Withdrawal in Syria,
TIMES
(Dec.
31,
2018),
Officials
Say,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/31/us/politics/trump-troopwithdrawal-syria-months.html
[https://perma.cc/7ZBB-JY9T]
(informing that President Trump has ordered a withdrawal of all troops
from Syria).

15.

Syria War: What We Know About Douma ‘Chemical Attack,’, BBC
(July
10,
2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east43697084 [https://perma.cc/G2U5-Q93V].

16.

Security Council Fails to Adopt Three Resolutions on Chemical
(Apr.
10,
2018),
Weapons
Use
in
Syria,
U.N. NEWS
https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/04/1006991
[https://perma.cc/XV9H-2TEH].
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with the Syrian chemical weapons attacks in collaboration with the
U.K. and France. 17 The goal of these actions was to destroy the
facilities to prevent future mass atrocity crimes. 18
On April 14, 2018, Russia proposed a Security Council proposal to
condemn these actions by the U.S. and called for the U.S.-led
coalition to “immediately cease such actions and refrain from any
further use of force in violation of international law.” 19 While Russia
argued that the coalition’s actions were illegal under international
law, the U.S. did not agree. According to a Department of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memo released in May 2018, the U.S.led use of force in Syria adhered to historical precedent and was
justified on the basis of U.S. national interest in regional stability,
prevention of a worsening humanitarian crisis, and chemical weapon
nonproliferation. 20 The U.S.-led coalition’s actions are consistent with
other actions that have been taken by NATO in Kosovo, Libya, and
other countries, and supports a precedent for the U.S. using military
force for humanitarian reasons without UN authorization despite the
fact that the U.S. has not publicly stated its position on doing so. 21

The Need for a Framework
The Security Council’s veto system can breed these deadlock
situations, as demonstrated by Russia’s failure to approve use of force
against the Assad regime. Until a framework for use of force without
UN authorization is codified, the international community may
continue to be unable to intervene in humanitarian crises when UN
authorization is impossible.
There is precedent for intervention in the name of humanitarian
crisis—the U.S. used military force to end mass atrocities in Kosovo
when NATO bombed Serbia and Yugoslavia to address the ethnic
cleansing of Albanians. 22 The U.S. also used military force in Libya
17.

Office of Legal Couns., Slip Opinion on the April 2018 Airstrikes
Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities (May 31, 2018), at 2.

18.

Id. at 11.

19.

Press Release, Security Council, Following Air Strikes against Suspected
Chemical Weapons Sites in Syria, Security Council Rejects Proposal to
Condemn Aggression, U.N. Press Release SC/13296 (Apr. 14, 2018),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13296.doc.htm
[https://perma.cc/KR2Z-B8VX].

20.

Office of Legal Couns., supra note 17, at 11-12.

21.

Id. at 6, 19.

22.

1999-Operation Allied Force, AIR FORCE HIST. SUPPORT DIVISION (Aug.
23,
2012),
https://www.afhistory.af.mil
/FAQs/FactSheets/Article/458957/operation-allied-force/ [https://perma.cc/VP2QQ5HB].
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when the U.S., France, and Britain attacked government facilities
near Benghazi and successfully protected civilians from attacks by
their government. 23 The Trump administration followed along this
vein with its action in Syria in April 2018, and by building on this
momentum, has presented the opportunity to cement a new norm.
The OLC memo on airstrikes in Syria pushed the international
community closer to a framework for this issue and is, as Harold Koh
writes, a “lawmaking moment”—a chance to solidify customary
international law as it relates to use of force for humanitarian
intervention without UN authorization. 24 The Trump administration’s
response to the 2018 chemical weapon attacks is a prime opportunity
to establish pertinent appropriate guidelines for R2P from this point
onward and to establish a framework for future action. Without a
framework, there is the potential to abuse the justification of
humanitarian intervention. Russia’s actions in Ukraine, which Russia
falsely justified along humanitarian lines, 25 is an example of why it is
important to establish a framework for the use of force for
humanitarian reasons. Moreover, a framework will crystalize the
existence of this practice into customary international law.

A Framework for Non-UN Authorized Use of Force
for Humanitarian Intervention
Building on previously proposed work on this topic, we set forth
the following framework for R2P justification of regional organizations
or coalitions using force to prevent mass atrocity crimes and intervene
in humanitarian crises without UN Security Council authorization.26
While the use of force without explicit UN authorization may be
perceived as pushing the limits of international law, a framework
helps to ensure that use of force will fit under R2P. The criteria are as
23.

Mary Dejevsky, Putin attacks Britain and US for ‘violating Libya
(Nov.
12,
2011),
resolution’,
INDEPENDENT
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-attacksbritain-and-us-for-violating-libya-resolution-6261163.html
[https://perma.cc/HJY8-YF8J]. While the use of force in Libya was
authorized by the UN Security Council, Russia has subsequently argued
that the intervention far exceeded what was contemplated or authorized
by the resolution.

24.

Harold Hongju Koh, Humanitarian Intervention: Time for Better Law,
111 AJIL UNBOUND 287, 288.

25.

Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry Condemns Another Russian “humanitarian
convoy” Arrived in Donbas, UKR. INDEP. INFO. AGENCY NEWS (Nov. 24,
2018, 1:15 PM), https://www.unian.info/war/10350636-ukraine-sforeign-ministry-condemns-another-russian-humanitarian-convoy-arrivedin-donbas.html [https://perma.cc/BGE8-WLPT].

26.

Williams et al., supra note 3, at 476.
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follows: (1) a prima facie case must be established that atrocity
crimes are occurring or are about to occur; (2) peaceful options have
been exhausted; (3) the Security Council is unable to act in a timely
and appropriate manner; (4) any military force used must be limited
to low-intensity options designed to protect populations and must be
carried out in such a way as to limit collateral damage; (5) the use of
low-intensity military force must be authorized by a legitimate
authority, which could include the UN General Assembly, regional
organizations, or international coalitions; (6) the intervention must
come at the request of credible opposition groups that represent
victims of atrocity crimes and shall be done collectively by members
of the international community; and (7) the use of force should be
followed up with or integrated into a larger strategy and policy for
addressing the humanitarian crisis. Below, we will apply these criteria
to the April 2018 chemical weapon attacks by the Assad regime and
the subsequent actions taken by the U.S.-led coalition to demonstrate
how it fits into this framework.
The first tenant of the framework calls for the establishment of a
prima facie case. For a prima facie case to be established, an
international body or multiple independent sources must demonstrate
through evidence that mass atrocity crimes are occurring or will occur
unless immediate action is taken to protect a population. 27 In the days
after the April 2018 chemical weapon attacks in Syria, various
credible sources, including the World Health Organization (WHO),
documented the symptoms of victims and witness testimonies.28
According to the WHO,
27.

Id. at 492.

28.

See Tarik Jasarevic, WHO Concerned About Suspected Chemical
Attacks in Syria, STATEMENT BY THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
[WHO]
(2018),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2018/chemicalattacks-syria/en/ [https://perma.cc/F5NY-U9SM] (documenting signs
and symptoms consistent with exposure to toxic chemicals); Donia
Chiacu et al., Douma Symptoms Consistent with Nerve Agent: U.S.
(Apr.
9,
2018,
12:19
PM),
State
Department,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syriastatedept/douma-symptoms-consistent-with-nerve-agent-u-s-statedepartment-idUSKBN1HG2IB [https://perma.cc/RD2E-SCNL]; Yonette
Joseph & Christina Caron, Burning Eyes, Foaming Mouths: Years of
Suspected Chemical Attacks in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/world/middleeast/syriachemical-attacks-assad.html [https://perma.cc/K8CZ-KTF9] (providing
a timeline of the major episodes of the suspected chemical attacks);
Syria Civil Defense Condemn Chemical Attack on Douma, Syrian
American Medical Society [SAMS] (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.samsusa.net/press_release/sams-syria-civil-defense-condemn-chemical-attackdouma/ [https://perma.cc/5AX5-NVEG] (documenting the various
symptoms caused by the chemical weapon attacks).
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[A]n estimated 500 patients presented to health facilities
exhibiting signs and symptoms consistent with exposure to toxic
chemicals. In particular, there were signs of severe irritation of
mucous membranes, respiratory failure and disruption to central
nervous systems of those exposed.” 29

Given the Assad regime’s failure to fulfill its 2013 commitment to
destroying its chemical weapon stockpile, 30 the continued presence and
threat of mass atrocity crimes, and the credible documented proof of
the attacks, a prima facie case is established.
The second framework criterion is that peaceful options must be
exhausted prior to non-UN authorized use of force; these peaceful
options include, but are not limited to: peace plans, ceasefires,
political sanctions, and targeted economic sanctions. 31 As was the case
in 2012, and as is the case even more so in 2018, peaceful attempts at
protecting Syria’s population and ending the humanitarian crisis have
failed.
The Syria crises illustrates the extent to which the international
community must exhaust peaceful options before low-intensity
military options could be considered. In Syria, the international
community has consistently tried to broker peace plans, both through
regional organizations and through the UN, with little success. In
failing to create a peace plan, the United States, European Union, and
Arab League have imposed extensive sanctions that restrict the travel
and freeze the assets of Syrian officials, 32 block the purchase of Syrian
oil, 33 and target Syrian information technology. 34 The EU has also
imposed seventeen rounds of sanctions. 35 Neither the sanctions nor the
29.

Jasarevic, supra note 28.

30.

Daryl Kimbal & Kelsey Davenport, Timeline of Syrian Chemical
Weapons Activity, 2012-2018, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (2018),
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-ChemicalWeapons-Activity [https://perma.cc/QQ3T-5DYA].

31.

Williams et al., supra note 3, at 495.

32.

Katherine Marsh, Syria Sanctions Declared as Violent Crackdown
GUARDIAN,
(May
6,
2011,
1:23
PM),
Continues,
THE
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/06/syria-sanctionscrackdown-eu [https://perma.cc/X22S-4TFN].

33.

Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. A/HCR/21/50
(2012).

34.

Press Center, Fact Sheet: New Executive Order Targeting Human Rights
Abuses Via Technology, U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, OFF. OF PUBLIC AFF.
(Apr.
23,
2012),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg1547.aspx [https://perma.cc/4G2L-WLBP].

35.

Stephen Castle, European Union Tightens Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (July
24,
2012),
https://www.nytimes.com
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suggested peace plans have stopped the Assad regime from
committing atrocities against its civilian population. It is clear that
peaceful attempts to address the Assad regime’s behavior have been
ineffective and exhausted. Therefore, a non-lethal response to the
April 2018 chemical weapon attacks would fail to prompt a change in
the regime’s behavior.
The third framework criterion requires that the UN Security
Council be unable to act in a timely or appropriate manner in
response to a humanitarian crisis. As mentioned above, after the April
2018 chemical weapon attacks in Syria, the UN Security Council
failed to adopt resolutions that would have provided opportunities for
fact-finding missions and future accountability due to Russian
vetoes. 36 For example, the U.S. submitted a draft resolution that
would have (1) created a UN independent mechanism for one year
that would help to identify those responsible for the use of chemical
weapons in Syria, (2) condemned the use of chemical weapons by
expressing support for the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons fact-finding mission, and (3) called on all parties
in Syria to cooperate with investigators and humanitarian efforts.37
Russia’s veto of this resolution, as well as its vetoes of past
resolutions, indicate that the Security Council is deadlocked. Due to
the politics of the Syrian conflict and Russia’s loyalty to the Assad
regime as demonstrated by these failed resolutions, the Security
Council is unable to act in a timely and appropriate manner to
address the Assad regime’s crimes against its own people.
The fourth tenant of this framework states that any military force
used must be limited to low-intensity options designed to protect
populations. In the context of the U.S.-led airstrikes responding to
Syria’s April 2018 chemical weapon attacks, these actions “satisfy
both the ‘right intentions’ and ‘proportionality’ standards proposed
by the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS) report and the UN High-level Panel for the
legitimate use of force for humanitarian purposes.” 38 The missiles used
by the U.S.-led coalition were low-intensity in comparison to chemical
weapon strikes and were carried out in such a way as to limit

/2012/07/24/world/europe/european-union-tightens-sanctions-onsyria.html [https://perma.cc/6T52-Z3ZM].
36.

U.N. NEWS, supra note 16.

37.

Press Release, Security Council, Following Three Draft Texts on
Chemical Weapons Attack in Syria, Security Council Fails to Agree
upon Independent Investigative Mechanism, U.N. Press Release
SC/13288 (Apr. 10, 2018).

38.

Williams et al., supra note 3, at 498; R2P Report, supra note 4, at XII.

219

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019)
Use of Force in Humanitarian Crises

collateral damage. 39 For example, the missiles were launched early on
a Saturday morning and were specifically aimed at chemical weapon
facilities. 40
The fifth framework criterion calls for authorization by a
legitimate authority, as is required for use of force by the ICISS
report. 41 Legitimacy can stem from authorities including regional
organizations, coalitions of the willing, 42 or multilateral operations,
such as NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo. 43 Authority may be
established by regional organizations and international coalitions.44
The U.S.-led action in Syria following the April 2018 chemical weapon
attacks were authorized by a legitimate authority—a coalition of the
United States, United Kingdom, and France—all of whom felt it was
appropriate to respond to the attacks in this way. 45 Notably, the
Russian resolution seeking to condemn the U.S., France and the U.K.
was defeated in the Security Council, with only three supporting
votes: Russia, China, and Bolivia. 46
The sixth framework criterion is that the intervention must come
at the request of credible groups that represent victims of atrocity
crimes. In the context of Syria, a request for intervention could result
from a consensus among several opposition groups and leaders or from
credible members of a group that are being directly impacted by
atrocity crimes. 47 This criterion aims to ensure that the victims or
potential victims are requesting the military intervention, ensuring
the interveners have the right intentions behind their actions.
Moreover, this use of military force shall be done collectively by
39.

See Zachary Cohen & Kevin Liptak, US, UK and France Launch Syria
Strikes Targeting Assad’s Chemical Weapons, CNN POLITICS (Apr. 14,
2018, 11:33 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/13/politics/trump-ussyria/index.html [https://perma.cc/8YDY-PWXS] (reporting that the
launches were “precision strikes” that were “coordinated” and
“targeted”).

40.

Id.

41.

R2P Report, supra note 1, at 32.

42.

Id. at 54, 59.

43.

Saban Kardas, Humanitarian Intervention: A Conceptual Analysis, 2
ALTERNATIVES: TURKISH J. OF INT’L REL. 21, 41 (2003); Williams et al.,
supra note 3, at 500.

44.

R2P Report, supra note 1, at 53-4.

45.

Cohen & Liptak, supra note 39.

46.

Dan Boylan, U.N. Security Council rejects Russian bid to condemn
U.S.-led strikes on Syria, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2018),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/apr/14/un-securitycouncil-rejects-russian-bid-condemn-us/
[https://perma.cc/UU7UBM2Y].

47.

Williams et al., supra note 3, at 502.
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members of the international community, whether through
multilateral operations, regional organizations, or coalitions of the
willing to prevent abuse or misguided intentions.
Finally, the seventh tenant of the framework requires that use of
force should be followed up with or integrated into a larger strategy
and policy for addressing the humanitarian crisis. In doing so,
countries and/or regional organizations can ensure that they continue
supporting the population in crisis beyond an immediate use of force
to protect them. This may include providing guidance and funding in
humanitarian aid, stabilization support, and post-war recovery. In the
context of Syria, this can include international support of efforts
towards accountability, governance, and stabilization. Unfortunately,
as announced in August 2018, the Trump administration pulled $230
million in funding to Syria, which was previously allocated for
stabilization efforts. 48

Conclusion
R2P offers the opportunity for use of military force in the name of
humanitarian intervention without UN authorization, but needs a
guiding framework for doing so. Following a framework, such as the
one we have proposed in this article, would allow for interventions to
protect civilians in situations where the Security Council is gridlocked
but a rogue state is actively harming or plans to harm its people and
would codify a customary international legal norm for humanitarian
intervention. Moreover, this framework would provide opportunities
for justifying the use of force along the lines of international law and
for the U.S. to cite international law as a legal justification for its
actions.

48.

Courtney McBride, U.S. Terminates Funding for Stabilization Efforts in
Syria, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-sterminates-funding-for-stabilization-efforts-in-syria-1534525186
[https://perma.cc/Y3JH-FR3Q].
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